Smart meter installed at private school following year-long standoff

Smart meter installed at private school following year-long standoff

Smart Meters - File

Smart Meters

After more than a year of refusing a smart meter, Roots and Wings Montessori  has lost its power to say no.

BC Hydro cut electrical service to the private Langley school on Friday, March 13.

“I was shocked. I couldn’t believe they would just shut the power off to a school,” said principal Kristin Cassie.

“They had been threatening to cut off the power for over a year now because we have continually refused to have a smart meter installed.”

Then, over the weekend, when Cassie wasn’t there, BC Hydro installed a smart meter.

“I really didn’t have a choice. But it’s a bullying tactic. I can’t believe in Canada they can force things on people not leaving you any choice.”

While residents can opt out of a smart meter but then pay exorbitant monthly fees to do so, commercial building owners cannot opt out, said Cassie.

Citizens for Safe Technology has launched a class action lawsuit against BC Hydro and the case is expected to be heard next month.

Una St. Clair is CST’s executive director and a Langley resident.

Her son once attended Roots and Wings, and she was the original force pushing the school against wireless technology.

“Initially when Una enrolled her son she told me about the dangers of wifi and I did a lot of research and educated myself on it,” said Cassie.

“I took all the wireless technology out and now everything is hardwired which is a hassle, let me tell you. But we felt it was important.”

The small school, actually located within Campbell Valley Park, is an Earth stewardship based program that has its own goats, chickens, llamas and gardens.

There are about 45 students attending the K-12 school. There is also a preschool program there too.

Cassie isn’t sure what the next steps are but she has let Citizens for Safe Technology know.

Smart Meter Replacement Nearly Complete….now this is the definition of pro active/common sense!

Smart Meter Replacement Nearly Complete

A Bluewater Power Smart Meter ( file photo by Melanie Irwin) A Bluewater Power Smart Meter ( file photo by Melanie Irwin)

Bluewater Power has nearly completed its task of replacing approximately 3,500 smart meters.

The utility was directed to do so by Ontario’s Electrical Safety Authority as a “preventative step” following a review of reports of meters catching fire in Saskatchewan.

CEO Janice McMichael-Dennis says staff have gone above and beyond doing this job in less than two months.

McMichael-Dennis says less then a handful still need to be replaced.

She says the overall cost of replacement is expected to total around $1-million.

She says Bluewater Power is now engaged in legal proceedings to recover the cost.

Boston Outlines ‘Smart Meters,’ Protected Bike Lanes And Other Transportation Initiatives


noun: initiative; plural noun: initiatives; noun: the initiative
  1. 1.
    the ability to assess and initiate things independently.
    “use your initiative, imagination, and common sense”
    synonyms: self-motivation, resourcefulness, inventiveness, imagination, ingenuity, originality, creativity, enterprise; More

    informalget-up-and-go, pep, moxie, spunk, gumption
    “employers are looking for people with initiative”

Boston Outlines ‘Smart Meters,’ Protected Bike Lanes And Other Transportation Initiatives


3. ‘Smart’ Parking Meters

"Not-smart" Boston parking meters (Jp Gary/Flickr)

Walsh also said the city will replace all 8,000 parking meters in Boston with “smart” meters that will take credit card and mobile payments, in addition to coins. This will make all meters across the city uniform. The new parking meters will also provide real-time data to the city, which Walsh said would “help us better manage our spaces at the curb.”

Bill proposes gradually lifting cap on electric competition-Dr. Hillman states, “this cannot happen!”

We definitely need to have competition in the Energy Business! 
I have made my position clear to Gov. Snyder and to Rep. Aric Nesbitt, Chairman of the House Energy Policy Committee.. Within the past  two weeks, they have received my articles  that appeared in ELSEVIER, Science of the Total Environment; 447 (2013) 500-514. Relationship of Electric Power Quality to Milk Production of Dairy Herds–Field Study with Literature Review by D. Hillman, Dave Stetzer, Martin Graham, Charles L. Goeke, Kurt E. Mathson, Harold H. Van Horn and Charles J. Wilcox, and,also Effects of Extraneous Electricity on Dairy Cattle, other Animals, and Humans — A Guide for Dairymen, Veterinarians, and Investigators of Stray the Journal of Veterinary Science and Medical Diagnosis (2014). by SciTechnol.
If you haven;t already viewed Representative McMillan’s Hearings you can find them at the following addresses:

Michigan Oversight Committee Hearing on Smart Meters 12.2.14 part 1

Michigan Oversight Committee Hearing on Smart Meters 12.2.14 part 2

Best regards,
Don Hillman

Bill proposes gradually lifting cap on electric competition

Meet Bina the next Super Human Intelligence….Let’s Play God in Vermont!!!

Published on Nov 27, 2014

BINA 48 (Breakthrough Intelligence via Neural Architecture, 48 exaflops per second processing speed and 48 exabytes of memory)

BINA48 is a social android that uses artificial intelligence based on the memories, attitudes, beliefs and mannerisms of a human being to interact with people. She is a part of the LifeNaut Project, an experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Cyber-Consciousness.

In the Summer of 2014 Bina Rothblatt, who contributed her personal information (along with several other people), visited and talked to Bina48 for the first time at the Terasem Movement Foundation in Vermont. This video documents their conversation.

Our Water Is Being Stolen From Us!……ANOTHER RED FLAG SHEEPLE!


The announcement that California is rapidly running out of water has put new pressure on our most precious resource that could, in turn, force increased prices and shut down organic food production. Ultimately, it could even threaten the food supply. FULL ARTICLE AT:

The Great Water Grab

A Special Report On The Privatizing of A Natural Public Resource

Our Water Is Being Stolen From Us!
The Rich Are Buying Up The Rights For Our Water, To $ell It Back To Us
NewsFocus – 120410

Unbeknown to most Americans, their most precious natural resource, as in life-giving drinking water, is being stolen, literally right out from under them. If they ever want a drink, they’ll have to buy it back, at a considerable price.

A recent episode of the hit TruTV investigative program, “Conspiracy Theory With Jesse Ventura,” has literally tapped into a water scandal that most of the US public has no idea about. Multi-national corporations and unscrupulous wealthy individuals are buying up water rights for some of the largest aquifers in the US and the world. With water predicted to become a scarcity within 20 years, it would appear that some of the elite wealthy are trying to corner the market on the earth’s most precious life-giving resource, water.

American oil-tycoon T. Boone Pickens was one of the first to rush to capitalize on the impending water shortage, investing a meager $100-million in a scheme that he readily admits will make him an easy billion dollars, if not far more.

In the Texas panhandle, Roberts County sits over the largest underground aquifer in the US, the Ogallala Aquifer, containing a quadrillion gallons of water. This vast underground reservoir reaches as far north as South Dakota. Roberts county is roughly 924 square miles, yet has only a meager 900 residents. Some people would say they were “ripe for the picking.” Perhaps that statement should read, “ripe for Pickens.”

Mr. Pickens has purchased 68,000 acres, as well as the right to drain up to 50% of the Ogallala aquifer to sell for his own personal profit. Needless to say, that isn’t exactly going over too well for many Texas residents.

Noise Considerations for Smart Grid Wireless

Corona Noise Considerations for Smart Grid Wireless Communication and Control Network Planning

1306 F3 coverAs the wireless receiver sensitivity levels surpass thermal noise levels, reliable operation of smart grid Distributed Generating System (DGS) wireless communication and control devices demands consideration of the power line produced noise spectrum. The power line noise spectrum varies based on voltage and current of transmission lines and load characteristics. The electrical-noise environment is anticipated to be more severe in a DGS than in a Conventional Electrical Power System (CEPS) due to the frequent changes in power distribution routing.

While most measurable noise occurs at frequencies less than 200 MHz, the corona noise spectrum extends up to 2000 MHz. The corona noise spectrum measured near a 26 kV substation was compared with corona generated in the laboratory. Using this data, in-band wireless receiver susceptibility levels for GSM, CDMA and LTE modulation techniques were experimentally evaluated and presented.


Reliable power distribution systems require smarter distribution and control of all accessible quality power generation resources to meet load demands with fewer interruptions. The power distribution system must withstand any loss of a transmission line or a generating station. The voltage, frequency, and steady state and transient stability of power must be within acceptable tolerances. The power distribution system should be safe, secure, low cost, and efficient [1]. An interconnected Distributed Generating System (DGS) with multi-users and multi-generators is inevitable for a smart grid power distribution system. In order to control the components of the DGS, a reliable communication
and information exchange system is necessary. The control system should have the ability to monitor and control the generating systems, transmission lines, distribution, distribution substations, and loads connected to the DGS. The control system, sensors, energy meters and communication and information exchange systems should have the ability to operate as intended and should not be susceptible to electrical noise produced either by the DGS or anticipated in the ambient environment. Electrical noise, that exceeds some threshold, will affect timely information flow, decision making processes, and control system function [2].

This article examines the electrical noise spectrum in a typical Conventional Electrical Power System (CEPS) environment. Based on the environmental noise spectrum evaluated, an analysis of the suitability of a reliable and secure wireless communication and control system for DGS operation is presented. Further, an overview of RF noise present in the transmission and distribution system environment is also discussed. Finally, the radiated frequency spectrum is presented for corona noise demonstrating how the corona noise at wireless system in-band frequencies will degrade the receiver sensitivity.

Conventional Electrical Power System (CEPS) and Distributed Generating System (DGS)

The CEPS architecture resembles an inverted tree in which the generating station is the main trunk, and the branches are transmission lines connected to loads [3]. The power transmission is unidirectional from the generating station to the loads. In contrast, the evolving smart grid DGS transmission architecture resembles a cellular or aero-mobile communication network architecture in which the power flow at any moment could be from any obtainable generating station (local or remote) to any load. Therefore, DGS transmission is characterized by frequent “make” and “break” dynamic architecture as compared to the inherently fixed or static nature of the CEPS architecture. The direction of power flow in DGS transmission lines are constantly changing.

In a DGS, the user and generator interconnected network architecture will be constantly reconfigured depending on power needs and power availability. The computation of anticipated load and available power at any instant must be known. Otherwise, any short circuit condition will lead to a voltage dip and an increase of current (10 to 1000 times) and the clearance of the short circuit condition leads to oscillations. Sudden loss of any generating station results in a drop in voltage while a loss of load results in a rise of voltage on the active part of the network. Any fault clearance typically takes two to three cycles [4], with circuit breakers clearing the fault condition producing corona and arcing for a half to one cycle. The transmission system connects a network of numerous loads and several generating sources. To restore a power system failure, an increment of generating sources must be matched to an increment of loads, then move on to next matching generators and loads. The duration of this matching process may be on the order of several seconds. The electrical noise produced by a DGS is expected to be much more severe than noise produced in CEPS because of frequent power connection and disconnection, controls, and several synchronization processes. Reactive loads in CEPS are typically corrected using centralized compensators. In a DGS, computing and compensating for reactive loads is a major challenge. The excessive reactive power creates over voltage and current conditions on the transmission lines produce corona and sometimes arcing. The transients and steady state noise produced in a power system is electromagnetic in nature and their time, location and severity of occurrence is random. A conceptual simple architecture of a DGS is shown in Figure 1.

1306 F3 fig1

Figure 1: A conceptual architecture of distributed generator system

Electrical Noise in DGS

The DGS may contain both common mode and differential mode electrical noise. Both noise types conduct and radiate through electrical circuits and associated metallic structures. The common mode noise flow is in the same direction on the live power conductors but flows differentially with respect to the ground conductors. The differential mode noise on any two power conductors is equal in magnitude but the flow is in opposite direction. The power loop area is one of the primary factors that must be considered for deciding the radiated emissions levels. The large loop areas produce the greater radiation. For differential mode noise radiation, the loop area formed between live power conductors must be considered, while, for common mode radiation, the loop area formed between live power conductors and ground conductor must be considered. In un-terminated or open circuited transmission lines, the loop area is formed through the free space similar to a monopole antenna [5]. The electrical noise source could be either from the loads, the DGS, or from natural events (for example, lightning). The noise produced in consumer loads such as electronic and digital devices connected to a DGS are regulated by government agencies (such as FCC, EU and VCCI etc.,) and will not be discussed here. Some electrical noise sources typically found in power system are noted.

  1. Power sysem that contains non-sinusoidal voltages.
  2. Voltage fluctuations, dips and interrupts.
  3. Switchgear noise due to circuit opening and closing.
  4. Oscillatory transients.
  5. Power surges.
  6. Power Line Communication (PLC) noise.
  7. Ctorona, Gap discharge and arcing.
  8. Lightning.

The electrical noise spectrum from Items (1) through (5) above is typically lower than 100 MHz [6]. The PLC produces broad spectrum of noise [7, 8]. The noise spectrum will be based on a single channel data rate and bandwidth of the transmission. The corona, Gap discharge, arcing and lightning noise spectrum extends up to 2 GHz. However, for a typical lightning event, there is significant noise below 200 MHz. Similarly the corona, Gap discharge and arcing events have significant noise below 1000 MHz. The lightning surge frequency spectrum has been studied by several researchers and is indicated in the references [6, 9]. The Gap discharge and arcing frequency spectrum details will not be discussed here. The corona radiates a periodic broadband spectrum for prolonged periods. Therefore, it is one of the interference nuisances to RF devices. The corona radiation effects on the wireless system receiver sensitivity levels are discussed below.


Corona is due to accelerated partial ionization, breakdown or discharge of gas molecules or atoms between two conductive surfaces under the influence of high electric fields that could appear as a blue luminous glow with a current typically measured in microamperes [10]. The corona occurs between conductive surfaces where there is a large concentration of charges and at smaller distance from the reference electrode.

At its onset, the corona will be intermittent or pulsating, and if the field is further increased, the corona current reaches a steady state. When the electric field is increased further there will ultimately be a transient or steady state arcing or sparking occurrence with a sudden jump in current.

The arcing voltage is typically two to six times the corona voltage. The corona does not completely connect the conductive surfaces of electrodes, but arcing bridges the conductive surfaces of electrodes. The corona inception voltage is higher for longer gap distances. But the relationship depends on the dielectric constant, temperature, pressure, and other physical variations between the gap surfaces. The corona is a high impedance phenomena occurring at high voltage and lower current. Not all corona charges from one electrode reach the other. Some portion of charges escapes from the corona and is radiated. Therefore, corona is an interference nuisance to RF devices. The corona radiates a periodic broadband spectrum. A typical corona radiation pattern is shown in Figure 2. As shown in Figure 2, the corona noise period is two times per power cycle.

1306 F3 fig2

Figure 2: Radiated corona periodic broadband spectral distribution from single phase AC power

Radiated Corona Spectrum Measurement in a GHz Transverse Electromagnetic (GTEM) Cell

Corona frequency spectrum is a well understood subject. The corona itself can directly radiate RF energy without aid of an antenna. The corona frequency spectrum data presented in most publications do not isolate the radiations from the electrical support structure used for corona simulation. The electrical structure could act as an antenna or tuned element and alter the radiation characteristics of the corona stream. The corona streams direct radiation is measured and presented in this section in its isolated form.

The radiating frequency spectrum of a corona was investigated in a GTEM cell. The GTEM Cell is a frequency extended variant of the traditional Transverse Electromagnetic (TEM) cell. The GTEM Cell is a large tapered section coaxial stub with air dielectric and a characteristic impedance of 50 Ω. One end of the stub is a feeding point and the other end is terminated by a combination of non-inductive high power resistors and RF absorbers. When a radiating object is placed between the center plane and outer ground plane, the total radiated power is directly proportional to the power measured at the apex of the GTEM. The radiated power level varies as inverse of distance ‘d’ between center plane and bottom ground plane. The GTEM supports a frequency spectrum from DC to several GHz. A 25 cm long coaxial cable mounted in the GTEM was used for generating corona. The center conductor at one end of the coaxial cable was looped back closer to the outer metallic shield as shown in Figure 3. The approximate diameter of the loop was 2 cm. The gap between the tip of the center conductor and the metallic shield of the coaxial cable was approximately 2.5 mm. The loop was placed between the GTEM center plane and the bottom ground reference plane, approximately at the center. The diameter of the loop was small enough so that the radiation contribution due to the loop was negligible up to 1 GHz. Several broadband suppression ferrites were added to the coaxial cable to prevent the cable from acting as a monopole antenna. A high voltage single phase AC generator was connected to other end of coaxial cable through the GTEM bottom ground reference plane. For these tests, voltage input applied to the coaxial cable ranged approximately from 2 to 4.5 kV. The stream of produced corona was approximately perpendicular to center plane of GTEM. The loop was rotated in its upright position 360° to provide for highest emission angle. At this angle, the frequency spectrum was measured and plotted for 2.5 mm, 7.5 mm and 10 mm gaps for frequencies between 30 and 1000 MHz. The data plot is presented for 10 mm gap in Graph 1. This setup provides a source of directly radiated corona spectrum that is mostly unaffected by the electrical supporting structures or polluted by the ambient environment. The generated energy spectrum of directly radiated corona is therefore available for use experimentally to compare against other types of interfering signals as applied to real world systems.

1306 F3 fig3

Figure 3: Test setup from measuring corona spectrum in GTEM cell


1306 F3 graph1

Graph 1: Radiated frequency spectrum of corona measured from a 10 mm gap

Radiated Corona Spectrum Measurement from 26 kV Substation

The radiated emission measurements from a local 26 kV/208V sub-station are presented in Graph 2. The measurements were made at an approximate 25 m horizontal distance from the radiating corona transmission conductors connected to string-insulators in the sub-station. The antenna and spectrum analyzers were located at an elevated location relative to the sub-station such that the radiating corona source from the sub-station was in line with the antenna. RF absorbers were placed on the sides and rear of the receive antenna to minimize the ambient noise. An investigative received power level measurement was made for both horizontal and vertical polarization using a broadband bi-log antenna. The received power levels were higher for the vertical polarization of the antenna and are therefore reflected in the plot. To maximize the received signal levels the antenna was moved 1 m distance horizontally and then vertically prior to recording the maximum levels. According to Friis transmission equation [11]

Pr/Pt = (λ/4πR)2Gor Got    (1)

  • Pr is power delivered to any load (Example: 50Ω receiver antenna port)
  • Pt is power input to transmit antenna (in this case, it is part of corona stream power that is being radiated)
  • Got is transmit antenna isotropic gain
  • Gor is measurement antenna (Broadband bi-log) isotropic gain
  • λ = free space wavelength of the measured frequency
  • R = measurement distance
  • (λ/4πR)2 is free space propagation loss(L) derived in Equation 3

The predicted effective isotropic received power level (Pr/Gor) in “dBm” at the measurement distance = (Analyzer reading in dBm – Gor in dBi ) (Pr/Gor) at any linear distance (R) between the radiating source and receive antenna = L (Pt Got)    (2)

Graph 2 shows the measured noise power levels (Pr/Gor) in “dBm” for the frequency range from 30 to 1000 MHz. The measurements were made when corona illuminations were observed on certain parts of the conductor. The number of conductors and number of phases involved in corona illumination could not be accurately determined. The Graph indicates that radiation levels extend to 1000 MHz, but the power levels gradually decrease with increasing frequency.

1306 F3 graph2

Graph 2: Radiated frequency spectrum of corona measured from a 26kV Substation at 25m distance

Corona Field Level Calculation at Closer Distance

Both Graphs 1 and 2 reveal the existence of a significant amount of radiated power up to 1000 MHz. Graph 2 indicates the measured received power level from the antenna near 1 GHz is -65 dBm at a 25 m distance. If it is assumed that the measuring instrumentation or control wireless transceiver for a DGS must be placed at 1 m distance from the transmission lines on a pole, the expected power level at the receive antenna port at 1 m distance can be calculated using the following Friis free space narrowband propagation path loss (L) equation. (Assuming that the path is clear of terrain or other objects and measurements are made in far-field.)

Free space propagation loss (L) = 20 log10 (Distance in meters) + 20 log10 (Frequency in MHz) – 27.56 dB    (3)

Equation 3 is also successfully applied to broadband short distance propagation loss calculations [12]. The calculated loss (L) at 1000 MHz for 24 m is 60 dB Therefore, the field power at a 1 m distance from the corona producing transmission line is calculated to be -5.0 dBm The effective average field power will be based on the duty cycle of the noise which is the ratio of pulse width and pulse repetition rate.

For pulsed RF, the effective average power is 10 log10 (duty cycle). For 60 Hz power, the pulse repetition rate is 8.3 ms, but the corona noise pulse width for a given spectrum bandwidth is difficult to measure. The corona noise pulse width increases with AC field intensity (kV/cm) between the corona stream conductors. If a 1% duty cycle is assumed, then the effective received average power for the same setup at 1 m distance from the radiating source is -25 dBm.

In the absence of interfering noise, the modern wireless receivers using typical antenna are capable of processing signal levels lower than thermal noise levels (-114 dBm/MHz at room temperature). Therefore, the corona noise level is considered very high when compared to the sensitivity of a typical Cellular receiver which is approximately -120 dBm/MHz. This clearly demonstrates that corona radiation must be considered before planning any wireless communication system for controlling the DGS.

Wireless Communications System for DGS Control Functions

In-band noise is the primary concern for any wireless communication system. In-band noise degrades the ability of the communication system to receive low signal levels. There are no dedicated wireless frequency bands available for electrical power system controls. Either unlicensed or licensed bands must be used for wireless controls. The corona noise will affect both the unlicensed and licensed bands operating below 1000 MHz.

Although the modern wireless receivers are capable of functioning with the signal levels much lower than the noise levels, the overall signal to noise ratio is still important. For most data systems, after some noise threshold level is reached, the error rate will increase with increasing noise. The comparison of corona (noise) to signal frequency bandwidth and 1% error amplitude is as shown in Figure 4.

1306 F3 fig4

Figure 4: Corona noise level is higher than receiver sensitivity levels


Corona Noise and Cellular Base station Receiver Sensitivity

The minimum required signal-to-noise ratio (S/N) of wireless systems must be maintained in order to have a reliable communication link. The presence of increased in-band interference at the antenna receive port requires that the desired signal level must be increased to maintain the S/N ratio. The noise immunity levels are dependent on the wireless devices modulation techniques and receiver bandwidths. The noise immunity levels for the following modulation techniques were investigated using a 1900 MHz GSM Base Station, an 850 MHz CDMA Base Station and a 700 MHz LTE Base Station:

  1. GSM (200 kHz)
  2. CDMA (1.25 MHz)
  3. LTE (5MHz)
  4. LTE (10 MHz)

The test setup is shown in Figure 5. The receive port of the base station was tested with a continuous wave (CW), a fixed frequency modulated signal, a random frequency noise level and laboratory generated corona, and the processed demodulated signal was analyzed for data error. Since there are several variations in the operations of diversity ports, they were disengaged during the tests. The modulated signal was fixed at -90 dBm for all tests and no data error was noted at this level. The input noise power level was then increased until a 1% data error was observed.

1306 F3 fig5

Figure 5: Base station receive port noise immunity test setup

The following input signals were used as noise:

  1. Continuous Wave (CW) signal
  2. 1 kHz 80% AM signal
  3. Random CW signal to sweep the receive frequency bandwidth at an 8 ms repetition rate. The AC corona noise spectrum repeats at every half power cycle of power (See Figure 2). For 60 Hz power the half cycle duration is 8.3 ms. Since 8.3 ms repetition rate signal was not available, an 8.0 ms repetition rate signal was used instead.
  4. GTEM generated corona noise at the receiver frequency bandwidth.

The noise signals (a) and (b) were applied at the center frequency of the receive channel. The noise immunity levels for 1% data error for different modulation technologies are shown in Table 1. Noise levels approximately 6 to 10 dB above 1% data error produce a sudden increase in data error (50 to 60% data error) rendering the system useless.

Modulation Technology Noise Source level above the signal level
CW dB 1 kHz 80% AM dB In-Band random CW at 8 ms repetition rate dB In-Band corona from GTEM dB
GSM (200 kHz) 10 8 10 **
CDMA (1.25 MHz) 20 18 20 15
LTE (5 MHz) – QPSK 42 42 40 34
LTE (5 MHz) – 64 QAM 37 37 37 32
LTE (10 MHz) – 64 QAM 40 40 40 34

Notes: ** Insufficient corona signal at 1900 MHz Table 1: Noise level in dB above the signal level for data error reaching approximately 1%

Table 1: Noise level in dB above the signal level for data error reaching approximately 1%

The wireless control stations for DGS will be installed at fixed locations. Therefore, the receiver operating range sensitivity levels can be fixed accounting for the anticipated noise levels and calculated link budget. The corona noise impact levels for a 1% data error are much higher than the signal levels. Therefore, implementation of a noise amplitude limiter circuit can solve the corona noise problems.


Mapping the land line communication along the power transmission lines for DGS communication and control is one of the major technical and economic challenges. Therefore, wireless should be a more viable alternate. The electrical power noises associated with corona, arcing and lightning will seriously degrade the communication and control frequency band spectrum usage. The immunity test results provided in Table 1 show that wireless system is more susceptible to corona spectrum than the CW or modulated CW signals. The noise levels will be severe, especially during extreme weather conditions when most power outages are likely to occur. This article establishes that Corona has a significant noise frequency spectrum up to 1 GHz. Published works show that extremely high voltage transmission lines produce corona noise up to 2 GHz [13]. For any frequency spectrum use for wireless communication below 2 GHz then special consideration should be provided as follows:

  • Plan the link budget so that low sensitivity wireless communication devices may be employed.
  • Consider use of broadband wireless communication systems for minimizing interference.
  • Modulation techniques using OFDM (such as WiMax and LTE) are more secure and reliable compared to other modulation techniques. favicon


  1. K. Budka et al., “GERI- Bell Labs Smart Grid Research Focus: Economic modeling, Networking, and security and Privacy”, 2010 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communication”, pp 208-213.
  2. IEEE Std 2030, “IEEE Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information Technology Operation with the Electric Power System (EPS), End-Use Applications, and Loads, 2011, pp 6-13.
  3. T.M. Overman, R.W. Sackman, “High Assurance Smart Grid: Smart Grid Control Systems Communications Architecture”, 2010 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communication”, pp19-24.
  4. M.Pavela, P.G.Murthy, “Transient Stability of Power Systems (Theory and practice)” John Wiley & Sons, 1994, pp 4.
  5. D. Moongilan, “Radiation characteristics of short unterminated transmission lines”, 2009 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, pp 57 – 62.
  6. E. N. Skomal, A. A. Smith, Jr., “Measuring the radio frequency environment”, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company Inc., 1985 pp 305-311.
  7. S. Gali, A. Scaglione, Z. Wang “Power line communication and Smart Grid”, 2010 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communication”, pp 303-308.
  8. M. Tanaka, “High frequency noise power spectrum, impedance and transmission loss of power Line in Japan on intra building power line power line communications”, IEEE Transactions on consumer Electronics, Vol. 34, No.2, May 1988 pp 321-326.
  9. C. Leteinturier, J. H. Hamelin, A. Eybert-Berard “Submicrosecond characteristics of lightning return-stroke currents.”, IEEE transaction on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol.33, No.4., November 1991, pp351 – 357.
  10. D. Moongilan, “Corona and arcing in power and RF devices” 2009 IEEE Symposium on PSES, pp 1-7
  11. C.A. Balanis “Antenna Theory Analysis and Design; 3rd Edition, John Wiley & Sons 2005, pp95
  12. H.R. Anderson, “Fixed Broadband Wireless System Design” John Wiley & Sons, 2003, pp 31
  13. W.E. Pakala, V.L. Chartier , “Radio noise measurements on overhead power lines from 2.4 to 800 kV,” IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-90, No.3, May/June 1971, pp. 1155 – 1165.

This article won the Symposium Best Paper Award at the 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility in Pittsburg PA.

© 2012 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from the 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility proceedings.

author moongilan-dheena Dheena Moongilan
is a Distinguished Member of Technical Staff at Bell Laboratories of Alcatel-Lucent. He is a Principal EMC design Consultant for Alcatel-Lucent. He has published 20 formal IEEE papers on EMC and holds two US patents. He is a NARTE certified EMC Engineer and Master EMC Design Engineer. He holds a B. E. in electrical engineering and a M. S. E. E. from the College of Engineering at Madras University in Guindy, India, and M. S. E. E. computer engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago.

For Immediate Release: Planned Global WiFi from Space Will Destroy Ozone Layer, Worsen Climate Change, and Threaten Life on Earth

Planned Global WiFi from Space Will Destroy Ozone Layer, Worsen Climate Change, and Threaten Life on Earth

Five companies are gearing up to provide high-speed global WiFi coverage from space within the next three to four years. This would be an ecological and public health nightmare, according to a recently-formed international coalition: the Global Union Against Radiation Deployment from Space (GUARDS).

Global Union Against Radiation Deployment from Space

For Immediate Release

 Date: March 25, 2015

Who: Global Union Against Radiation Deployment from Space (GUARDS)

Contact: Ed Friedman, Maine USA, 207-666-3372

Planned Global WiFi from Space Will Destroy Ozone Layer, Worsen Climate Change, and Threaten Life on Earth

Five companies are gearing up to provide high-speed global WiFi coverage from space within the next three to four years. This would be an ecological and public health nightmare, according to a recently-formed international coalition: the Global Union Against Radiation Deployment from Space (GUARDS).

According to GUARDS, the extensive satellite networks required will endanger the ozone layer and significantly contribute to climate change. Rocket exhaust contains ozone-destroying chlorine, water vapor (a greenhouse gas), and aluminum oxide particles, which seed stratospheric clouds. Complete ozone destruction is observed in the exhaust plumes of rockets.

The New York Times (May 14, 1991, p. 4) quoted Aleksandr Dunayev of the Russian Space Agency saying “About 300 launches of the space shuttle each year would be a catastrophe and the ozone layer would be completely destroyed.”

At that time, the world averaged only 12 rocket launches per year. Maintaining a fleet of (ultimately) 4,000 satellites, each with an expected lifespan of five years, will likely involve enough yearly rocket launches to be an environmental catastrophe.

GUARDS’ second area of concern is WiFi itself. Although widely perceived as an unqualified good, WiFi operates using extremely rapid pulses of microwave radiation—the same radiation used in microwave ovens. And a parade of studies continue to be published and ignored implicating wireless technology in the dieoff of forests, the demise of frogs, bats, and honey bees, the threatened extinction of the house sparrow, and damage to the DNA of the human species. It is vital to the continuation of life that large parts of the earth be spared from the incessant radiation that accompanies wireless technologies.

“The human body”, says Dr Gerard J. Hyland, of the University of Warwick, UK, “is an electrochemical instrument of exquisite sensitivity”, noting that, like a radio, it can be interfered with by incoming radiation. If a signal can operate a mechanical device, it can disturb every cell in the human body.

On February 7, 2014, the U.S. Department of Interior stated that “the electromagnetic radiation standards used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) continue to be based on thermal heating, a criterion now nearly 30 years out of date and inapplicable today” in reference to the very limits governing radiation utilized by WiFi.

In 2011 the World Health Organization classified radiation emitted by cell phones, WiFi, and other wireless technologies as a Class 2B human carcinogen, along with lead, engine exhaust, and DDT. Yet, the global WiFi projects would make this exposure ubiquitous and inescapable.

A recent letter sent by 88 organizations, representing over a million people, to the European Economic and Social Committee outlines how governments are betraying the public trust by ignoring the hazards of radio frequency/microwave (RF/MW) radiation.

GUARDS’ mission is to halt plans for global WiFi, which would constitute a violation of the Nuremberg Code of Human Rights for non-consensual experimentation.

# # #

GUARDS is an international coalition of diverse groups that have joined together in order to stop the implementation of global WiFi from space, which threatens all life on earth.


Human Health

The 1500-page Bioinitiative Report on RF/MW health effects was published in 2012. The authors are 29 scientists from ten countries.  They reviewed thousands of studies showing interference with chemical processes in the body, implicating RF/MW in a whole spectrum of alarming effects including genetic damage, cancer, immune dysfunction, neurological injury, and infertility. The report can be found at <>.

The Letter of Notice sent in February 2015 to the European Economic and Social Committee by 88 organizations regarding the betrayal of public trust in ignoring the effects of RF/MW radiation can be found at <>.

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), a committee of the World Health Organization, has classified RF radiation, including that emitted by wireless technology, as a class 2B carcinogen. <>.

British physician Erica Mallery-Blythe has an excellent report focusing on Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity (EHS), which is now estimated to affect five percent of the world’s population.

Department of Interior: “the electromagnetic radiation standards used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) continue to be based on thermal heating, a criterion now nearly 30 years out of date and inapplicable today.” (


Studies show radiation from wireless technology harms the environment—both flora and fauna are affected ( and (

An October 31, 2014 presentation to the Manitoba Entomological Society, reviewing 91 studies on the effects of RF/MW radiation on honey bees, insects, birds, etc.:!topic/mobilfunk_newsletter/0RUPGTI4qQY

On ozone depletion and climate change from rocket exhaust: (

Satellite Deployment Plans

The five companies seeking to provide global WiFi radiation include:

SpaceX:    4000 satellites, 750 miles high

OneWeb:    2,400 satellites, 500-590 miles high

Facebook:    Satellites, drones, and lasers.

Google:    200,000 high altitude balloons (62,500 feet) (“Project Loon”)

Outernet:     Low-orbit microsatellites


LA Firefighters, Paramedics and Parents Against Cell Phone Towers in our Neighborhoods
See the attached PDF and Word documents

Firefighting News: L.A. County Firefighters Concerned by Potential Health Risk of Fire Stations Near Cell Towers

Firefighters rallied outside a Board of Supervisors meeting Tuesday morning in Downtown Los Angeles over cell phone towers they fear pose serious health risks to dozens of L.A. County fire stations. “We have 10 times the cancer rate of a lot of cancers, and leukemia, than the general population. We don’t need more exposure,” Currier said. One hundred seventy-seven cellphone towers are expected to be erected around L.A. County, mostly near police and fire stations, where firefighters say at least a dozen have already gone up. A spokesperson for LA-RICS, the agency tasked with installing the new towers, says they are meant to improve communication during emergency responses by int…

The Los Angeles Regional Interoperable Communications System

(LA-RICS) is a JPA (Joint Powers Authority) created to establish an integrated wireless voice and data communications system to serve law enforcement, re service, and health service professionals County-wide. LA-RICS has 86 members, including 82 cities, the County of LA, UCLA, and the LA and Inglewood school districts. The County of Los Angeles provided start up funding of $10 million and acts as the administrative agency. LA-RICS, with a Federal grant of $154.6 million, has contracted with Motorola Solutions to install the $280 million system, which includes: Approximately 230 new microwave radiation producing cell towers, including +/- 86 at County re and lifeguard facilities. Motorola, in coordination with LA-RICS’ third party environmental services consultant, was required to perform an RF emission safety study in advance of the planning and permitting process. This has not happened. LA-RICS and its contractors are now in the process of installing hundreds of 50-70‘ cell towers at County fire stations and lifeguard facilities WITHOUT First: Getting community input; Informing people about health impacts on firefighters and the families who live near the towers; Securing approval of City Councils; or Even following LA County’s own rules for new cell towers.

Stop Toxic Cell Towers (310) 639-1014